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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
BENJAMIN MATTHEW NUNLEY, : Case No. 20000196-CA 
Priority No. 15 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for 
Attempted Aggravated Assault, a class A misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 and 76-5-103(3) (1999), in the 
Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Michael K. Burton, Judge, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred 
on this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
See Addendum A (Judgment, Sentence and Conviction). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in adjusting 
a restitution upward to $19,646.15 where Appellant was originally 
ordered to pay $16,000 at his sentencing? 
Standard of Review: "We will not disturb a trial court's 
order of restitution unless the 'trial court exceeds the 
authority prescribed by law or abuses its discretion.'" State v. 
Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 1992) (quotation and 
citations omitted). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant Benjamin Matthew Nunley1s ("Nunley") challenge to 
the restitution order is preserved on the record for appeal 
("R.") at 64 (restitution hearing). His underlying sentencing is 
preserved at R.65. 
STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999) is determinative of the 
issue on appeal. It provides in relevant part: 
Sentences or combination of sentences allowed—Civil 
penalties- -Restitution—Hearing—Definitions 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: . . . (ii) plea of 
guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which 
the defendant is convicted or any other criminal 
conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility 
to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but 
not general damages, which a person could recover 
against the defendant in a civil action arising out of 
the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent 
of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise 
harmed, and losses including earnings and medical 
expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal 
payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, including 
the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, 
insured damages, and payment for expenses to a 
governmental entity for extradition or transportation 
and as further defined in Subsection (4)(c). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court 
determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result 
of the defendant's criminal activities. . . . 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court 
may sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of 
the following sentences or combination of them: . . . (c) to 
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probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; . . 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity 
that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any 
other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided 
in this subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant 
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as 
defined in Subsection (1)(e). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, 
the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as 
provided in Subsections (4)(c) and ( 4 ) ( d ) . . . . 
(b) . . . (ii) In determining whether restitution is 
appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in 
Subsection (4)(c). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine 
complete restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution 
necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused 
by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution 
the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the 
defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at 
the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered 
restitution shall be determined as provided in 
Subsection (8). 
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is 
appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the 
court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the 
court record. . . . 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or 
distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the time 
of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the 
issue. . . . 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an 
offense, the offense shall include any criminal conduct 
admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to 
which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of 
an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a 
conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any 
person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct 
in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for 
complete restitution, the court shall consider all relevant 
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facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense 
resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of 
property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related 
professional services and devices relating to physical, 
psychiatric, and psychological care, including 
nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance 
with a method of healing recognized by the law of the 
place of treatment; the cost of necessary physical and 
occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the 
income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if 
the offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; . . 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for 
court-ordered restitution, the court shall consider the 
factors listed in Subsection (8)(b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the 
burden that payment of restitution will impose, with 
regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on 
an installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed 
by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the 
payment of restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court 
determines make restitution inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer 
entering an order of restitution if the court 
determines that the complication and prolongation of 
the sentencing process, as a result of considering an 
order of restitution under this subsection, 
substantially outweighs the need to provide restitution 
to the victim. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, 
and Disposition in the Court Below. 
Nunley was charged by information with one count of 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-103(3) (1999). R.l-2. An arrest warrant was 
issued. R.3. Nunley entered a plea of guilty to attempted 
aggravated assault, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
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Code Ann. §§ 76-5-103(3) and 76-4-101. R.20. 
A sentencing hearing was held on January 11, 2000. R.65. 
Nunley was ordered to pay $16,000 (including $521 in medical 
expenses) in restitution at $1000 per month, in addition to 
court-ordered counseling. R.41-42(minute Entry),43(Judgment and 
Sentence),65 [16-20] . At Nunley's request, a restitution hearing 
was held on February 22, 2000. R.44,64. The victim, Joe Pilcher 
("Pilcher"), testified that his actual lost wages and medical 
bills totaled $19,646. R.64 [9-10,13-16] . The hearing judge 
imposed $19,646 in restitution to be payed at a rate of $1000 per 
month. R.64[21] . Nunley timely appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Nunley entered a plea of guilty to attempted aggravated 
assault. R.20 (Plea Agreement). The Information alleged that 
Nunley struck Pilcher in the knee with a baseball bat during a 
driving dispute. R.l-2. 
At a sentencing hearing held January 11, 2000, Nunley was 
sentenced to one year in jail. R. 41-42. The jail term was 
suspended pending satisfactory completion of probation. Id. The 
Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR"), which was considered by 
the court at sentencing, noted that Pilcher!s damages, including 
medical bills, amounted to $15,500. R.27. At the hearing, the 
State averred, and Nunley conceded that Pilcher!s actual damages 
were about $16,000. R.65[5]. Accordingly, the court ordered 
Nunley to pay $16,000 to Pilcher as compensation for lost 
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earnings during the six-week period he could not work and the 
$521 in medical bills that he had to pay as a result of his 
injuries. R.41-42 (Minute Entry). 
At Nunleyfs request, a restitution hearing was held on 
February 22, 2000. R.44,64. Nunley sought to challenge the 
$16,000 figure ordered by the court. Id. Pilcher testified as 
to his injury, his medical bills totaling $521.15, his work as a 
plumber, the period he could not work, and his typical billings 
for various periods of the year. R.64[4-16]. He established 
March through May, the period in which he was laid up with his 
injury, were his most profitable months. R.64[9]. 
The court found that Pilcher averaged $19,125 in lost wages 
during those months. R.64[21]. When added to the $521 in 
medical bills, the court concluded that Nunley owed Pilcher 
$19,646.15 total. Id. The court accordingly amended the 
restitution amount to $19,646.15. Id. 
Nunley objected to the upwardly amended restitution amount 
at the hearing. R.64[21-26]. He asserted that he knew two other 
plumbers who would be willing to testify that Pilcherfs billing 
rates were inflated, and suggested that Pilcher's billing records 
could be falsified. R.64[22]. Nunley further suggested that 
Pilcher produce previous income tax returns to prove his income. 
R.64[25]. 
As to Nunley!s proposed witnesses, the court asked Nunley 
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why he did not present those witnesses at the hearing. R.64[24]. 
Nunley responded that he did not know that people would be able 
to testify at this particular proceeding, and claimed that he did 
not know about "court procedure." Id. The court invited Nunley 
to present the witnesses at another hearing, but told Nunley that 
he would not change the restitution order based simply on 
Nunleyfs own summary of what the proposed witnesses might say. 
R.64 [25-26]. The court also informed Nunley that he would have 
to provide notice to the court if he planned on calling the 
witnesses, as well as inform the witnesses that they needed to 
come to testify. R.64[26]. 
As to the tax returns, the court noted that they would not 
be helpful in that Pilcher made more money in the spring months, 
when he was laid up with his injury, than at other times of the 
year. R.64[26]. Nunley responded that they would nonetheless 
provide proof of an average income. R.64[26]. 
The court concluded that it was "comfortable with the 
substantialness [sic] of the proof." R.64[26]. The judge 
further stated that Nunley 
hit [Pilcher] with a baseball bat in the knee and 
ma[d]e it so he couldn't work [from March to May, and 
so] he lost that kind of income. . . . I think he has 
billables there that show a time when he did less work, 
that that's what he got. 
That's why I'm comfortable with the substance of 
what he's given me; but if you have somebody who's got 
a contradictory view, I guess I'm happy to hear that, 
but I guess we need to have notice. . . . And I guess 
you need to know that they need to be told to come. 
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R.64 [26] . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion in amending the 
restitution amount upward from $16,000 to $19,646.15. The 
maximum amount of restitution that the court could impose was 
factually established at Nunley's sentencing, where it arrived at 
the $16,000 amount based on the PSR and a figure presented by the 
State and agreed to by Nunley. Moreover, the $16,000 figure 
adequately reflected statutory considerations prescribed in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999) . The increase of the restitution 
award chills Nunley's right to a restitution hearing. 
Accordingly, the trial could only impose a maximum of $16,000, 
and less if the evidence merited it, at Nunley's restitution 
hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
ORDERING RESTITUTION IN AN AMOUNT THAT EXCEEDED THE 
FACTUALLY ESTABLISHED FIGURE OF $16,000. 
The trial court abused its discretion in ordering Nunley to 
pay $19,646.15 in restitution under § 76-3-201. See State v. 
Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 1992). A "trial court 
[has] both discretion in sentencing to select one or a 
combination of options including probation, see [] § 76-3-201(1), 
and a mandate to order restitution when appropriate: 'When a 
person is adjudged guilty of criminal activity which has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
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impose, the court shall order that the defendant make 
restitution' to victims unless it determines that restitution is 
inappropriate, id. at § 76-3-201(3)(a) []; see also State v. 
Snyder, 747 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1987)." State v. Dickey. 841 P.2d 
1203, 1207 (Utah App. 1992). 
The trial court's "authority [to order restitution,] 
however, is limited by the sentencing statute. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-201(2) (Supp.199[9]). Therefore, we will not disturb 
the court's restitution order unless it exceeds that prescribed 
by law or otherwise abused its discretion." State v. Schweitzer, 
943 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah App. 1997) (citing Twitchell, 832 P.2d at 
868; State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887-88 (Utah 1978)). 
The guidelines for determining the amount of restitution to 
be imposed are outlined in § 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) and -(8) (a)-(c) . 
They are as follows: 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal 
activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages1, in 
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court 
shall order that the defendant make restitution to 
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for 
conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes 
of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in 
Subsection (1) (e) . . . . 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution 
for an offense, the offense shall include any criminal 
conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing 
1
 Section 76-3-201 (1) (c) provides, "'Pecuniary damages1 
means all special damages . . . which a person could recover 
against a defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or 
events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and 
includes . . . losses including earnings and medical expenses." 
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court or to which the defendant agrees to pay 
restitution. A victim of an offense, that involves as 
an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of 
criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed 
by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of 
the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other 
conditions for complete restitution, the court shall 
consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense 
resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of 
property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related 
professional services and devices relating to physical, 
psychiatric, and psychological care, including 
nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance 
with a method of healing recognized by the law of the 
place of treatment; the cost of necessary physical and 
occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the 
income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if 
the offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; . . 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other 
conditions for court-ordered restitution, the court 
shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8) (b) 
and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the 
burden that payment of restitution will impose, with 
regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on 
an installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed 
by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the 
payment of restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines 
make restitution inappropriate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (8) (a)-(c) . 
In the present case, the trial court abused its discretion 
in ordering Nunley to pay $19,646.15 because the trial court had 
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previously established the amount of restitution at $16,000 when 
it considered the PSR and the State's adjusted figures to arrive 
at that dollar amount. R.27;65[5]. Accordingly, the $16,000 
figure became fact as to the amount of loss for restitution 
purposes under § 76-3-201. See State v. Tindal, 748 P.2d 695 
(Wash. App. 1988) . The court, therefore, could impose a maximum 
of $16,000, or less if the evidence merited it, at Nunley's 
succeeding restitution hearing. 
In Tindal, the Court of Appeals for the State of Washington 
held that the amount of restitution that the defendant owed was 
legally established for purposes of restitution where the 
"certificate of probable cause set forth the amount" and the 
certificate was "incorporated by reference into the plea 
agreement" underlying the restitution order. Id. at 696. The 
Court stated that the specified amount "bee[a]me[] fact" and, 
therefore, that defendant could be ordered to pay it under 
Washington's restitution statute. Id. (citing RCW 9.94A.370 (2)) . 
Accordingly, the Washington Court of Appeals vacated the 
restitution order of $25,666.39 because it exceeded the factually 
established amount. Id. 
The reasoning of Tindal compels the conclusion that the 
trial court in the present case abused its discretion in ordering 
Nunley to pay $19,646.15. At the January 11, 2000, sentencing 
hearing, the court established that Nunley owed Pilcher $16,000. 
R.41-41 (minute entry). That figure was premised upon a figure 
of $15,500 set forth in the PSR, R.27, which was "incorporated" 
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into the sentencing hearing. Tindal, 748 P.2d at 696; R.65[5]. 
The $16,000 amount was also premised on an adjusted estimate of 
$16,000 proposed by the State and agreed to by Nunley at his 
sentencing hearing. R.65[5]. 
Moreover, the figures set forth by the PSR and the State 
adequately reflect the statutorily prescribed considerations 
contained in § 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) (lost earnings and medical 
expenses) and § 76-3-201(8) (a) (ii) (medical expenses and lost 
income resulting from physical injury suffered by victim). The 
PSR statement regarding Pilcher's damages evinces the way in 
which it adequately accounted for the factors set forth in § 76-
3-201: 
The victim [] estimat[ed] his medical expenses at $500 
but will provide the court with an exact amount. He [] 
estimated losing profits of $15,000 due [to] his not 
being able to work . . . for one and one-half months. 
He stated his average daily gross income at that 
particular time of year is $500 per day, and was unable 
to perform his usual duties for 30 working days. 
R.27. The transcript concerning the State's minor adjustment to 
$16,000, which Nunley agreed to, likewise reflects Pilcher's 
damages. R.65[5]. 
Finally, as a matter of policy, trial courts under similar 
circumstances as those of the case at bar should not be able to 
increase the amount of a restitution order because it chills a 
defendant's exercise of his right to a restitution hearing. See 
State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712, 715 (Utah App. 1992) ("defendant 
is statutorily entitled to a 'full hearing' on the question of 
restitution") (citing § 76-3-201 (3) (c)) . As in cases where 
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defendants prevail on appeal and cannot thereafter be sentenced 
more harshly, defendants like Nunley, who agree with the State as 
to the amount of restitution at a preceding sentencing hearing, 
should not be subject to an increased restitution order simply 
because they elect to have the restitution hearing to which they 
are entitled. See, e.g., State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179, 180 
(Utah 1981) . Indeed, the specter of either the prosecution or 
the court threatening the possibility of a higher restitution 
award should the defendant proceed with a restitution hearing 
acts as the same sort of hindrance to the exercise of such right 
as the threat of a harsher sentence after a successful appeal. 
Id. 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court abused its 
discretion in increasing Nunleyfs restitution award. See 
Twitchell, 832 P.2d at 868. For purposes of restitution, the 
$16,000 figure "bee[a]me[] fact" because the State, the court, 
and Nunley agreed to that amount at the sentencing hearing. 
Tindal, 748 P.2d at 696. Moreover, the $16,000 figure adequately 
represents the statutory guidelines set forth in § 76-3-201. 
Finally, the trial court's increased restitution order chills 
Nunley1s exercise of his statutory right to a restitution 
hearing. See Starnes, 841 P.2d at 715; see, e.g., Sorensen, 639 
P.2d at 180. Accordingly, the trial court could only impose a 
maximum of $16,000, or a lesser amount if the evidence warranted 
it, at Nunley!s succeeding restitution hearing. 
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CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Nunley respectfully requests this 
Court to vacate the erroneous restitution order and remand for 
resentencing. 
SUBMITTED this /£& day of June, 2000. 
CATHERINE E. LILLY (J 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, CATHERINE E. LILLY, hereby certify that I have caused to 
be hand-delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court 
of Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-
023 0, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, 
Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Third Floor, P.O. 
Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this JOt day of 
June, 2000. 
CATHERINE E. LILLY (J 
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ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT MURRAY COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BENJAMIN MATTHEW NUNLEY, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 991200735 FS 
Judge: MICHAEL K. BURTON 
Date: January 11, 2000 
Clerk: lindav 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: October 11, 1971 
Audio 
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED ASSAULT (amended) -
Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/17/1999 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 
day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s). 
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE 
$1000.00 PER MONTH BEGINNING 2/28/2000 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0 
Page l 
Case No: 991200735 
Date: Jan 11, 2000 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Pay fines and fees as agreed 
No Violations of the Law 
Evaluation and Treatment as deemed necessary. 
COURT ORDERED DEFT TO COMPLETE ANGER MANAGEMENT CLASSES AND FAMILY 
COUNSELING AS AP&P DIRECTS 
DEFT TO PAY RESTITUTION OF $16,000.00 
COURT ORDERED $1000.00 DUE 2/28/2000. 
DEFT TO REPORT TO AP&P (PRESTON KAY) IMMEDIATELY 
COURT ORDERS JAIL TO BE IMPOSED IF RESTITUTION IS NOT PAID, AS 
ORDERED. 
Dated this j f day of C L ^ , 20 oo . 
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THIRD DI9TRICT COURT MURRAY COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BENJAMIN MATTHEW NUNLEY, 
Defendant. 
$ MINUTES 
: RESTITUTION HEARING 
Case No: 991200735 FS 
Judges MICHAEL K. BURTON 
Date: February 22, 2000 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lindav 
Prosecutor: WALSH, DAVID 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): HEINEMAN, ROBERT K 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth? October 11, 1971 
Audio 
Tape Number: 00-128 Tape Count: 650 
CHARGES 
(amended) -1. ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/17/1999 Guilty Plea 
HEARING 
COUNT: 650 
JOE PILCHER, VICTIM, SWORN AND TESTIFIES ON STATE BEHALF. STATE 
EXHIBIT 1 (INVOICES) WERE MARKED, OFFERED AND IDENTIFIED BY VICTIM. 
COUNT: 1300 
STATE REDIRECT OF JOE PILCHER 
COUNT: 1110 
DEFT CROSS EXAMINATION OF VICTIM. STATE WITHDRAWS EXHIBIT. 
COUNT: 1700 
COURT ORDERS RESTITUTION DUE IN AMOUNT OF $19125.00 FOR WAGES AND 
PROFIT LOST, $521.00 MEDICAL FOR TOTAL: $19646.15 
Page l 
Case No: 991200735 
Date: Feb 22, 2000 
COUNT: 1960 
DEPT'S STATEMENT TO COURT AND OBJECTION TO AMOUNT DUE. COURT 
ADVISES DBPT TO HAVE HIS ATTORNEY MOTION THIS UP AGAIN, IP 
NECESSARY. 
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